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DESTROYERS FOR NAVAL BASES: 
HIGHLIGHTS OF AN UNPRECEDENTED TRADE 
William H. Langenberg 
Introduction. In early Septemher 
] 940, the world was in a turmoil. The 
BatLle of Britain was nearing its climax, 
and elsewhere throughout the globe 
international tension ran high. Election 
year strife was just heginning to aug-
ment the furor of isolationist-interven-
tionist clashes in the United States. This 
background provided a filling setting 
for the transmission of the following 
message to Congress by President Frank-
lin D. Roosevelt on 13 September: 
I transmit herewith for the infor-
mation of the Congress notes ex-
changed between the British Am-
bassador at W m;hington and the 
Seeretary of State on September 
2, 1940, under whieh this Govern-
II1rnt has acquired the right to 
Ica!'r naval and air bases in New-
foundland, and in the islands of 
Bermuda, the Bahamas, J amaiea, 
Sl. Lucia, Trinidad, and Antigua, 
and in British Guiana; also a copy 
of an opinion of the Attorney 
General dated August 27, 1940, 
regarding my authority to cr>n-
summate this arrangement. 
The right to hases in Newfound-
land and Bermuda are gifts-gener-
ously given and gladly received. 
Thc othcr hases mentioned have 
heen acquired in exchange for 
fifty of our old destroyers ... 1. 
This action by the President created 
a hcated controversy. Its legality and 
neutrality were openly questioned, and 
the sub rosa nature of .the associated 
negotiations was severely criticized. 
Howevcr, as dramatic events in Europe 
and activities of a national election 
began to dominate newspaper spaee, the 
furor aroused by the deal gradually 
suhsidcd. 
Contemporary World Events. In 
ordcr to view the destroyers-naval basco 
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trade in proper perspective. a brief 
review of contemporary world events 
seems desirable. 
From the time of the defeat of 
Poland until April J 940, the European 
conflict was ill a state of relative in-
activity. On 9 April] 940, however, this 
temporary stalemate elided. Germany 
launched a blitzkrieg attaek on Norway 
and Denmark which appalled the world 
by its startling success. One month later, 
on 10 i\lav 19-1-0, the invasions of 
Belgium, ~iolland, Luxemhourg, and 
France began. 
On the day thc Germans marched 
into th e Low COllntries, Nevillc 
Chamherlain resigned his post as Great 
Britain's Prime i\ linister. Jle was suc-
ceeded hy Winston Churchill, who im-
mediately formed a new coalition 
Cahinet and prepared to lead his nation 
through its gravest crisis. 
Meanwhile, the Nazi offensive made 
rapid advances. On 14 May the Duteh 
Army surrendered, and the German 
assault turned westward toward the 
classic battlefields of northern France. 
Armored mobile columns cut through 
north of the Somme to the English 
Channel. From therc they proeeeded 
northeastward to the Channel ports-
within sight of Britain itself. I n only 11 
days the Germans had a('compli!'hcd 
what they had failed to do in 4 years of 
hitter fighting during World War L 
This was a brilliantly executcd mili-
tary campaign. It had an important 
secondary effed of creating panic and 
demoralization among the Allied forees. 
On 28 May, King Leopold of Belgium 
surrendered. The French Commandcr in 
Chief, Gcncral Weygand, attempted to 
form a line of defcnse at the Somme. 
This tadic was unsucees..c;ful. On 4 June 
the British Expeditionary Force was 
eva('uatl'd from Dunkirk. The Gt'rmalls 
then tllrned south loward Paris. 
Frane(' did not Ion/! surviv(\ IIH' Nazi 
om;I~I\I/!hl. Pnris ("I'll on 1-' . .11111(', nnd :1 
days Inter the Pl'lain govl'rIImcllt slIed 
for an armistice. Britain now stood 
alone in opposition to the Nazi enemy. 
Inception of an Idea. The idea of 
procuring American warships for usc 
ngain:::t Germany was first sugg($ted hy 
French Prcmicr Paul Reynaud. llc wm; 
cncouraged by thc announcement on 16 
April 1940 that the Anglo-French Pur-
chasing Commission, which was nego-
tiating for American arms, could obtain 
planes of almost any type then heing 
produced for the military services in the 
Unitcd States.2 As a result, he sent to 
Washington on 14 Maya rather startling 
proposal that thc American Governmcnt 
arrange for the "sale or lease of old 
destroyers. "3 
On the following day, Will!lton Chur-
chill sent President Roosevelt au even 
more breathtaking request. Titling him-
self "Former Naval Person," he wrotc: 
All I ask now is that you should 
proclaim non-belligerency, which 
would mean that you would help 
IlS with everything short of actu-
ally engaging armed forces. Im-
mediate needs are: First of all, thc 
loan of forty or fifty of your 
older destroyers ... 4 
This cahle from Chun:hill ww; tlw 
first he had sent to Roosevelt since 
becoming Prime Minister. It was also the 
first of a series whieh dealt with the 
subject of procuring American destroy-
ers. These messages were to have con-
siderahle influence on consummating 
the trade. 
Initial American Reaction. The initial 
reaction by President Roosevelt to the 
requests for destroyers was not en-
couraging to the Allies. On 16 May he 
rabled Churchill that the loan or gift of 
IIH' vesgrls would require ... "the Sll(~­
eific authorization of til(! Conp;rc!lg anell 
alii not c(\rtain that it would LI(~ wise for 
thal sU!rgestion to he made to the 
Congress at this moment."5 To William 
Bullitt, American Ambassador in Paris, 
he cabled that: 
Any exchange of American de-
stroyers probably inacceptable be-
cause of enormous sea areas which 
must be patrolled by us and 
would require Congressional ac-
tion which might be very difficult 
to get. Our old destroyers cannot 
be sold as obsolete as is proved by 
fact, all of them are now in 
commission and in use or are in 
process of being commissioncd for 
actual use. 6 
l3ut this initial negative reaction did 
not last for long .. The capitulation of the 
Low Countries, soon followed hy thc 
evacuation of Dunkirk and the armistice 
appeal by France, imparted a ~ense of 
urgency to the administration's program 
for aiding Britain by the sale or Ica~e of 
war material. The transfer of destroyers 
began to appear in a new light. 
Significant Developments-June 
1940. By June 1940, favorable senti-
ment toward aiding England "by any 
means short of war" was prevalent in 
the inner cireles of the Roosevelt admin-
istration. Only two Cabinet members, 
Secretary of War· Harry Woodring and 
Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, 
were laggards in this respect. Harold 
Ickes, controversial Secretary of the 
Interior, was the first among this influ-
ential group to urge the President to 
send obsolete warships to Britain. On 5 
June he advocated selling "some of our 
obsolete airplanes and destroyers to 
England and France.,,7 As yet, however, 
President Roosevelt refused to be com-
mitted on the subject. 
Legislative actions occurred during 
.1 une which scrved both to facilitate and 
hinder the ultimate trade. Senator i\lor-
ris Sheppard of Texas, Chairman of the 
Committee 011 i\liIitary Affairs, offt'red 
all administration-sponl'ored ,111\('1\(1-
ment to one of the pending defense 
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bills. It authorized the War Department 
to exchange uns{~rviceahle or surplus 
materials for others of which then: was 
a shortage. This was an attempt to 
ex tend the "trade-in" method then used 
to supply the Allies with aireraft. By 
this system, "obsolete" planes were 
"traded-in" to the manufacturers for 
ncwer models. The older versions were 
then shipped to Britain. Sena.tor Ben-
nett Clark of Missouri, a vociferous 
isolationist, declared that the amend-
ment was "an evasion of international 
law and of the Neutrality Act."8 De-
spite vigorous isolationist opposition, 
however, this measure became law on 2 
J!Jly. 
Meanwhile, an apparent obstacle to 
the destroyer transfer arose. Senator 
David Walsh of Massachusetts, Chairman 
of the Committee on Naval Affairs, 
obtained passage on 2B June of an 
amendment to the Naval Appropriations 
BilI. This section stipulated that 
no military or naval equipment of 
any kind shall be disposed of by 
sale, exchange, or in any other 
manner unless the Chief of Staff 
and the Chief of Naval Operations 
first certify, for military and naval 
equipment respectively, that the 
property to be disP9sed of is not 
essential to the defcnse of the 
country.9 
Another significant dcvelopment also 
took place during this month. On 20 
June, in a move ostensibly designed to 
broaden the bipartisan nature of the 
administration 's foreig~ policies, Presi-
dent Roosevelt appointed two Republi-
cans to key Cabinet posts. Henry L. 
Stimson was selected to rcplace Wood-
ring as Secretary of War. Stimson, for-
mer Secretary of State under Prcsident 
IIoover, had the reputation of favorin/! 
strong l'upport for the Aflics. I~rank 
Knox. who as.'Hlllwd Edison's ofrie!: as 
S('erdary of the Navy, was the fortnl'r 
puhlislu:r of the anti-New Deal, pro_uall 
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aid short of war" Chicago Daily News. 
While these events were occurring on 
the domestic scene, the war in Europe 
reached a critical stage for Britain. Italy 
entered the conflict on 10 June, and the 
threat of Italian submarines furthcr 
jeopardized England's chances of survi· 
val. Churchill expressed his fears and 
reiterated his former request for de· 
stroyers in a cable to Roosevelt on II 
June: 
I have already cabled you about 
aeroplanes including flying boats 
which are so needful to us in the 
impending struggle for the life of 
Great Britain. But even more 
pressing is the need for destroyers. 
Italian outrage makes it necessary 
for us to cope with much larger 
number of submarines which may 
come out into the Atlantic and 
perhaps be based on Spanish 
ports. To this the only counlcr is 
deslroyers. Nothing is so impor-
tant as for us to have 30 or 40 old 
destroyers you have already had 
reconditioned. We ean fit them 
very rapidly with our asdics and 
they wiII bridge over the gap of 6 
months before our wartime new 
construction comes into play. We 
will return them or their equiva-
lents to you without fail at 6 
months notice if at any time you 
need them. The next 6 months are 
vital ... Not a day should be 
lost. 1 0 
While these messages to Roosevelt 
concerning Britain's need for destroyers 
indicated the urgency of the siluation, 
Churchill saved his trump card until 
later. On 24 June he wrote to Mac-
kenzie King in Canada and emphasized 
the danger that, if England fell, there 
was the possibility that "Hitler would 
gel the Brilish fleet. ,,11 Four days laler, 
in a cable lo J ,ord Lothian, Brilain's 
Ambassador to the Uniled Stales, he 
Slated: 
Never cease to impress on Presi-
dent and others that, if this coun-
try were successfully invaded and 
largely occupied after heavy fight-
ing, some Quisling Government 
would be formed to make peace 
on the basis of our becoming a 
German Protectorate. In this case 
the British Fleet would be the 
solid contribution with which this 
Peace Government would huy 
terms. 12 
These references to loss of Lhe British 
Fleet served to bring England's crisis 
closer to American thoughts. With the 
world's largest navy at its disposal, 
Germany might actually expand the war 
to the shores of the United States. 
A Trade is Conceived. The news that 
Britain was seeking American destroyers 
somehow leaked out to the press, and 
expressions of opinion on the subject 
began to appear. 3 On 12 June Ernest 
K. Lindley, writing in his column for 
the Washington Post and other news-
papers, suggested America run the risk 
of violating international law by con-
voying ships to England or, failing that, 
by "selling a flock of old destroyers to 
the British. ,,14 Public opinion was not 
as y~t very strong on the subject, 
however, largely through indifference 
and lack of information. 
Within the administration, the possi-
bility of tran~ferring some destroyers 
now hegan to be given more considera-
tion. In early July, Joseph Alsop, an-
other Washington correspondent, was a 
guest for dinner at the British Embassy. 
A staff member confided to him some 
of the contents of Churchill's urgent 
appeals to Roosevelt for destroyers. 
Alsop, in turn, urged Benjamin Cohen, 
special assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral, to use all his influence in support 
of the lransf er of ;'0 or 60 sueh war-
ships to England. From his information 
he fell that, without such naval re-
inforcement, Britain might not be able 
to hold the Channel against invasion. 1 5 
Cohen brought this idea to Harold 
Ickes, who. on 5 J nly "spent a lot of 
time arguing with the President that, hy 
hook or by crook, we oUfht to aeecdc 
to England's request. "1 Roosevelt, 
however, was now bound by the Na-
tional Defense Aet of 28 June 1940. In 
reply to Ickes, he stated that the de-
stroyers eould not be transferred with-
out a certification from the Navy that 
they were useless for defense purposes. 
In addition, he felt that such an action 
would be difficult since the Navy was 
reconditioning more than 100 of them 
for its own usc. 1 7 
For the United States, however, the 
ramifications of a possible surrender of 
the British Fleet now began to assume 
grea ter significance. Lord Lothian 
cabled Churchill on 6 July that Ameri-
can opinion was becoming aware of this 
eventuality.IS Among the White House 
advisers this fear also increased in mag-
nitude. There was general agreement in 
the administration that some means 
Illust be found to bolster Britain's sea 
defenses. But a feasible method to do 
this was not immediately apparent. 
Statutes and congressional opposition 
stood in the way. 
The temporary impasse was ended in 
late July. For some time the Navy had 
been anxious to obtain sea and air bases 
on islands in the Atlantic and Carib-
bean. These were desired to safeguard 
approaches to the Panama Canal and 
strengthen hemispheric defense. Since 
Britain held title to certain islands 
which would be suited for this purpose, 
the administration conceived the idea to 
arrange some sort of exchange. 
On 23 July President Roosevelt dis-
cussed this idea with Secretary of the 
Navy Knox. The President expressed 
opposition to taking title to the h;lands, 
thl·n·by inhl·riting their political, l'lhnie, 
and l'(!OnOlllic prohh·IlI~. lit· pn'ferre'd to 
a:;k the Brith;h and Colonial Govern-
mrnts to Ir:lsc till' sill':;.19 Roosevelt 
made no attempt to specify the terms of 
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such agreements, hecause he felt these 
could be arranged Inter. The President 
asked Colonel Knox, who wm; dining 
with Lord Lothian that evening, to 
sound him out on the proposal. Lo-
-thian, in turn, was expected to get the 
concurrelH:e of Churchill. With a basis 
for negotiations thus established, the 
trade began to develop more rapidly. 
Negotiations Begin. On 31 July Chur-
chill again cabled Roosevelt directly: 
It has now become most urgent 
for you to let us have the destroy-
ers ... for which we have 
asked ... We have a large con-
struction of destroyers and anti-
U-hoat craft corning forward, but 
the next 3 or 4 months open the 
gap of which I _have previously 
told you. Latterly the air attack 
on our shores has become injuri-
ous ... Destroyers are frightfully 
vulnerable to air bombing, and yet 
they must be held in the air 
bombing area to prevent seaborne 
invasion ... 
This is a frank account of our 
present situation and I am confi-
dent, now that you know exactly 
how we stand, that you will-Ieavc 
nothing undonc to ensure that 50 
or 60 of your oldest destroyers 
are sent to me at once ... Mr. 
President, with great respect, I 
must tell you that in the long 
history of the world this is a thing 
to do now .•. 20 
By this time Churchill's pleas were 
receiving more attention. At the Cabinet 
meeting on 2 August, the transfer of 
destroyers was discussed at length. In 
Roo~evelt'~ own words, there was im-
JllI!diatl' agn'('nll!nt that "tlw survival of 
IIII! Brili~h Isles lIIuler (;('rnulII all;u:k 
might vcry possibly (lepeJld OJI geLLiJlg 
Ih('s(' de~lroyers." But he al~o recog-
nized that Icgislation would be 
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"necessary" to authorize any deal con-
cerning the warships. The President felt 
that, if the British Government would 
give positive assurances that the British 
Fleet ... "would not under any con-
ceivable circumstances fall into the 
hands of the Germans," the opposition 
in Congress would be "greatly les-
sened."21 
By early August the domestic politi-
cal situation had also changed favorably 
for approval of the destroyer transfer. 
In June the Republican Convention had 
broken with isolationist control. The 
delegates had nominated an avowed 
internationalist, Wendell WiIlkie, whose 
ideas on assistance to Britain were "all 
aid short of war." In July, Roosevelt 
had accepted an unprecedented third 
term nomination. Both parties now 
attempted to appeal to the pro-English 
sentiment of the voters. 
In order to facilitate passage of the 
necessary legislation through Congress, 
the Cabinet decided at the 2 August 
meeting to sound out W illkie's views on 
the transfer. Roosevelt agreed to call 
William Allen White, noted editor and 
head of the Committee to Defend 
America by Aiding the Allies. White, 
who was friendly with WilIkie, was to 
seek his approval, together with that of 
Repuhlican congressional leaders, and 
thus reduce the opposition to the mea-
sure.22 . 
Meanwhile, the proposal of ex-
changing naval bases for destroyers had 
been transmitted to - Churchill by 
Lothian. On 3 August Churchill replied 
to his ambassador: 
[The] second alternative, i.e., 
[granting of] bases [in British 
possessions], is agreeable, but we 
prefer that it should be on lease 
indefinitely and not sale. It is 
under~tood tlHlt this wiII enable us 
to secure oestroyers and flying 
hoats at onee. It is, as you say, 
vital to sellie quickly. Now is the 
time when we want the de-
stroyers ... Co ahead on these 
lines full steam.2 3 
To the proposal for making a declara-
tion regarding the disposition of the 
British Fleet in ease of England's defeat, 
however, Churchill demurred. He be-
lieved Britain ... "would not tolerate 
any discussion of what we should do if 
our island were overrun.,,2 4 Ina cable 
to Lothian he stated: 
... It would obviously be impos-
sible for us to make or agree to 
any declaration being made on 
such a subject. I have repeatedly 
warned you in my secret tele-
grams and those to the President 
of the dangers United States 
would run if 'Great Britain were 
successfully invaded and a British 
Quisling Govc'rIIment came into 
office to make the best terms 
possible for the surviving in-
habitants. 1 am very glad to find 
that these dangers are regarded tis 
serious, and you should in no wise 
minimize them. We have no inten-
tion of relieving United States 
from any well grounded anxieties 
on this point ... Pray make i~ 
dear at once thnt we could never 
ngree to the Iilighl\!IiL (:Olllpro-
mising of our full liherty of 
ac~tion, nor tolerate any slH:h dc'-
fentist llllnouncement, the effeet 
of which would be disas-
trous ... 2S 
These developments limited the alter-
natives for any proposed destroyers-
naval bases trade. Transfer of the war-
ships was now coupled with the lease of 
sites for naval and air bases in the 
Caribbean and Atlantic. 
Public Opinion Rises. i\ !though pre-
liminary negotiations on the df'stroyer 
deal were ostensihly slLb ro.~a, the possi-
bility of such llction was wioely known 
by early August. Attention was focused 
on the suhjeet on 4 August, when Gen. 
John J. Pershing, Commander of the 
American Expcditionary Force in World 
War I, addressed the country on a 
nationwide radio broadcast. Pershing 
had been induced to make the speech 
by William Allen White's Committee to 
Defend America by Aiding the Allies.26 
He warned that "all the things wc hold 
dear arc gravely threatened," and stated 
that thc best way for the nation to 
defend its heritage before it was too late 
was to aid Britain in every way within 
its power. The old warrior believed that 
this could be done immediately by 
providing the British or Canadian Gov-
ernments "at least fifty of the overage 
destroyers which arc left from the days 
of the World War. "27 
The urgency of Britain's needs 
tended to change the opinion of certain 
influential Americans concerning the 
proposed warship transfer. Senator Key 
Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Com-
mittce on Foreign Relations, announced 
his support of the plan. In June, after 
the fall of France, he had been so sure 
that England would also topple before 
the German onslaught that he depre-
cated "futile encouragemcnt to fight 
on," and advised the Churchill govern-
ment to abandon the British Isles to 
Hitler and bring its navy across the 
Atlantie.28 
Further evidences of popular support 
for the idea were also brought forward. 
Senator Alben Barkley, the administra-
tion's Senate leader, presented a peti-
tion signed by approximately 15,000 
citizens of his own state of Kentucky 
urging release of the destroyers to Great 
Britain.29 Influential newspapermen 
began promoting the cause in print. 
Thcse ineluded Washington columnists 
Walter Lippman, Joseph Alsop, and 
Rohert Allen: Frank R. Kf'nt of the 
Baltimorc S",,: 1I11rry Bin/!:hllm and 
IIl'rl)('rt A~lIr, I'uhli~her mill editor, 
re~pe(:ti\'dy, of the Louisville Co"ric'r-
Journal: Geoffrey Pllr~()nS, ehief edi-
torial writer of the New York Herald-
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Tribune; Russell Davenport, former 
editor of Fortune and now Willkie's 
campaign manager;30 and thc previ-
ously mentioned Ernest K. Lindley and 
William Allen White. 
Probably the most significant survey 
of public opinion on the subject was a 
Gallup poll published in August. It 
pointed out that England needed de-
stroyer ships to replace those which had 
bee~ damaged or sunk and that the 
United States had some destroyers built 
during the last World War which were 
being put back into active service. Ques-
tioned whether the United States should 
sell some of these ships to England, the 
Gallup respondents re~lied: Yes, 61 
percent; No, 39 percent. 1 
But all sentiment on the destroyer 
transfer was not favorable. Senator 
David Walsh was convinced that releases 
of the ships would not only violate 
Federal law but would be an act of war. 
There wcre also reports that high offi-
cers in the Navy Department believed 
that transfer of the vessels would 
weaken national defense. 
A different sort of objection was 
raised by the Dallas News. It was con-
cerned with the secrecy surrounding the 
entire transaction. In an open letter to 
President Roosevelt, the paper stated: 
... No citizen of this 'country can 
be disinterested in the effect on 
our future of a defeat for Great 
Britain ... Aid-the most effec-
tive aid that the U.S. can render 
without impairing our own na-
tional defense-may be unpopular 
at the moment because men and 
women do not understand thc 
dire necessity. But if they were 
told, sir, thcir support and their 
conviction would be immediatc in 
responsc.32 
TIIi~ increa~ed puhlie illtere~l ill the 
destroycr trllnsfer tcnded to impart 
grcatcr urgency to the negotiations. 
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Progress is Made. As previously men-
tioned, Roosevelt had decided to ascer-
tain Willkie's opinions on thc warship 
transfcr before bringing the necessary 
legislation before Congress. William 
Allen White had been designated to 
contact the Repuhlican candidate on 
this subject. Archibald MacLeish, Libra-
rian of Congress and member of the 
White House circle, was also involved. 
MacLeish was friendly with Russell 
Davenport, WiIlkie's campaign manager, 
and acted through him in an attempt to 
secure prior approval for the deal. i\ lac-
Leish and White succeeded in deter-
mining that Willkie privatcly approved 
of the destroyer transfer and would not 
make a campaign issue of it.33 But the 
Republican candidate failed to give the 
administration a blank check in negotia-
tions, even though he a, jJroved of the 
ob;~ctive.34 He hesitated to commit 
h .• nself completely while the entire sub-
ject was still cloaked with secrecy. 
With the threat of partisan attack on 
the exchange thus diminished. the 
administration proceeded with negotia-
tions. On 4 August Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull met with Lothian and 
discussed England's urgent need for the 
destroyers. Hull reemphasized the legal 
difficulties and probable time delays 
inherent in such a transaction, but 
reassured the' British Amhassador the 
United States was I!;iving the matter 
"attentive consideration."3 5 The same 
day Hull sent to the President a memo-
randum relating to the sale of the 
warships and auxiliary vessels. I t (~n­
closed a proposed draft of a hill to be 
offered in Congress which would spe-
cifically authorize such sale. This draft 
had heen prepared on 2 August hy 
Green II. Hackworth, Legal Adviser of 
the Slate Department, and it had been 
approved by Judge Townsend of the 
Department of.J ustil'e. In di"l'usging thi" 
proposed hill with Roosevelt, howeVl'r, 
the President and II ull agreed that there 
might be two ohjectlOns to sending it to 
Congress-one, thiit it wouid ~tir up 
., 
considerable. isolationist antagonism j the 
other, that many weeks of diseuH.~ion 
m igh t pass hdore it eCluld be 
adopted.36 Leaving the talks at this 
preliminary stage, Hull left for Georgia 
on vacation. His place was taken by 
Under Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles. 
At this juncture several members of 
the Cabinet, notably Attorney General 
Robert Jackson, vigorously supported 
by Secretary of War Stimson, persuaded 
Roosevelt that he need not submit the 
plan to Congress. Two weeks previously, 
on 22 July, Benjamin Cohen had trans-
mitted a memorandum to the President, 
via Harold Ickes, which advocated simi-
lar action. At that time, however, 
Roosevclt "frankly doubted if Cohen's 
memorandum would stand up.,,3 7 As 
time passed, however, these doubts dis-
solved under the increasing pressure 
from Churchill, particularly with respect 
to the possible loss of the British Fleet. 
On 13 August the initial framework 
of a tentative trade agreement was 
developed during a conference between 
the President, Secretaries Knox, Stim-
son, and Morgenthau, and Under Srere-
tary Welles. Hoosevell cabled this 
proposal to Churchill the same day: 
... I t is my helief that it may he 
possihle to furnish to the Brith:h 
Government as immediate a!'."is-
Lance at least 50 destroyers ... it 
would be necessary, in ·the event 
that it proves possible to release 
the material above mentioned, 
that the British Government find 
itself willing to take the following 
two steps: 
I. Agguranec on the purt of 
the Prime lVlinister that in tlw 
(Wl'nt thut the wull'rs of Grt'llt 
Brituin il('('omc nnll'nahlt, for 
British ships of war, the lall('r 
would not he turned over to the 
Germans or sunk, hut wonld he 
gent to other parts of the Empire 
for continued defense of the em-
pire. 
2. An agreement on the part 
of Great Britain that the British 
Government would authorize the 
usc of Newfoundland, Bermuda, 
the BlIhamas, J aJllaica, St. Lucia, 
Trinidad and British Guiana as 
naval and air hases by the United 
States ... with the understanding 
that the land necessary for the 
above could be acquired by the 
United States through purchase or 
through a 99-year lease.3 8 
Churchill replied affirmativcly to 
Roosevelt's proposal on 15 August: 
We can meet both the points you 
consider necessary to help you 
with Congress and with others 
concerned, but I am sure you will 
not misunderstand me if I sav that 
our willingness to do so m{lst he 
conditioned on our being assured 
that there will be no delay in 
letting us have the ships.3 9 
Tlw groundwork for the rx("han~e 
was now completed. During his 16 
August press conference, Rooscvelt 
made the first official statemcnt that 
discussions were taking place: "The 
United States Government is holding 
eonverf'ations with the Government of 
the British Empire with regard to acqui-
sition of naval and air baf'es for the 
defense of the Western Hemisphere and 
especially the Panama Canal ... ,>4 0 
No mention was madc of a pOf'f'ihle 
deal for destroyers. These negotiations 
continucd to be shrouded in sccrecy, 
and several obstacles remained to be 
surmounted before the trade could be 
completed. 
Obstacles. The fin;t major prohlem 
hindering further progress conccrncd 
the legality, under intcrnationallaw, for 
a neutral state to transfer warships to a 
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belligerent nation and, even more im-
portant, whether the President could do 
so without the approval of Congress. As 
previously mentioned, both the At-
torney General and his assistant, Benja-
min Cohen, had assured Roosevelt that 
such action was within his Icgal powers. 
Realizing that suhmission of thc 
proposed trade agreement to Congress 
would arouse considerable isolationist 
opposition and that time delays were 
inevitable in such a procedure, the 
President requested Attorney General 
Jackson to prepare a formal ruling on 
the subject. In respect to the naval 
bases-destroyer exehange, Jackson was 
asked to render a legal opinion on two 
questions: (I) whether such an acquisi-
tion could he concluded hy the Prcsi-
dent as an executive agreement, and (2) 
whether the President had authority to 
alienate title to such ships, and, if so, on 
what eonditions.41 
In an eight-page ruling delivered to 
Rooscvelt on 27 August, the Attorncy 
General reviewed the question in light 
of existing statutes and advised the 
President that: (1) the proposed ar-
rangcment could be eoncluded as an 
eXI:("utiv(! agn'clllcnt, and (~) there WllS 
prcsidential powcr to transfer title and 
possession of the proposcd considera-
tions upon certification hy appropriate 
5ta rr officers.4 2 
In hlllHling down this opinion, the 
Attorney General held that the Prcsi-
dent was legally empowered to effect 
the acquisition of the bases by exeeutive 
agreement, first, because as constitu-
tional Commander in Chief he was 
responsible for the maintenance of all 
agencies of national defense at their 
highest efficiency; and second, because 
the conduct of foreign relations was 
vested in the President hy the Constitu-
tion as part of the executive functioll. 4 3 
I II rrspert to the pertil"'"t provisions 
of the Treaty of Washington (l87t) and 
Article 8 of the Hague Convention XlI[ 
of 1907, which required that a neutral 
government take measures to prevent 
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the departure from its jurisdiction of 
any vessel intended to engage in belliger-
ent operations, if the vessel were spe-
cially adapted within the neutral's juris-
diction to warlike use, Jackson also had 
an answer. He ruled that these restric-
tions did not apply "to vessels like the 
overage destroyers, which were not 
built, armed, equipped as, or converted 
into, vessels of war with the intent that 
they should enter the service of a 
belligerent. ,>44 
The second major snag in negotia-
tions arose when Churchill balked at the 
idea of a straight trade, destroyers for 
bases. His immediate prohlem eon-
cerned domestic politics. He realized 
that, ill order to faeilitate the exchange, 
Roosevelt would allempt to make it 
appear favorable to the United States. 
Thus the Prime Minister ran the risk of 
being held up as soft, as having been 
outwitted by the Yankees.4 5 In Chur-
chill's words: 
The President ... was of course 
increasingly drawn to present the 
transaction to his fellow-country-
men as a highly advantageous bar-
gain wherehy immense securities 
were gained in these dangerous 
times by the United States in 
return for a few flotillas of obso-
lete destroyers. This was indeed 
true; but not exactly a convenient 
statement for m·e. Deep feelings 
were aroused in Parliament and 
the Government at the idea of 
leasing any part of these historie 
territories, and if thc issue were 
presented to the British as a naked 
trading-away of British posses-
sions for the sake of fifty destroy-
ers it would certainly encounter 
vehement opposition. I sought, 
thereforc, to place the transaction 
on the highest level, wherc indeed 
it had a right to stand, b(~('mlse it 
exprcssed and conserved the en-
during common interests of the 
English-speaking world.46 
By "place the transaction on the 
highest level," Churchill meant an out-
right gift of the base sites to the United 
States, ostensibly in return for a free 
gift of the destroyers. On this basis, 
negotiations proceeded. 
Meanwhile, a statement by the Brit-
ish Prime Minister served further to 
hinder progress. On 20 August Churchill 
made a report to Parliament on the war 
situation to date. In it he not only 
omitted any reference to the destroyers, 
but pointedly disassociated the bases 
question from any other consideration. 
While Roosevelt had hoped that the 
Prime Minister would prepare his public 
for acceptance of the American fro-
posal, what he did was the reverse.4 
On 22 August Churchill reiterated his 
position to Roosevelt: " ... I had not 
contemplated anything in the nature of 
a contract, bargain, or sale between us. 
It is the fact that we had decided in 
Cabinet to offer you naval and air 
facilities off the Atlantic coast quite 
independently of destroyers or any 
other aid. ,>4 8 
The next day Lothian cabled the 
Prime Minister that Sumner Welles had 
told him it was "ullerly impossihle for 
the President to send the destroyers as a 
spontaneous gift; the: could come only 
as a quid pro quo. ,>4 The situation was 
now at a temporary impasse. 
At this juncture Secretary of State 
Hull returned to Washington. On 23 
A ugust at a meeting of the Cahinet, the 
President told him: "Our negotiations 
with Britain on the bases and destroyers 
have boglicd down. Please see what you 
can do." 0 Almost immediately lIull 
commenced a study of the difficulties 
so far encountered. He reviewed in a 
meeting with Lothian and Roosevelt the 
entire progress of negotiations to date. 
On the morning of 26 August, Hull 
met with Green H. Hackworth, Legal 
Adviser of the State Department, and 
Judge Townsend of the Department of 
Justice. The three men sought SOIlW 
means to end the impasse. After a short 
discussion, Hackworth suggested that 
there might be a compromise between 
Churchill's desire for reciprocal gifts and 
the legal position binding the President 
to get something in return fpr the 
destroyers.s 1 His idca was that Britain 
could lease sites on Newfoundland and 
Bermuda as outright gifts, while the 
Caribbean bases were leased in con-
sideration for the cession of 50 de-
stroyers. 
Hull transmitted this proposal to 
the President, who gave it his tentative 
approval. The following day, after a 
Cabinet meeting, Roosevelt held a 
special session with Secretaries Knox, 
Stimson, and Hull. The four men went 
over the initial draft carefully, made a 
few changes in phraseology, and then 
approved it. That night the proposal 
was reviewed again by another group. 
In addition to Hull and Knox, this 
meeting was attended by Adm. Harold 
Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, who 
had to certify under the act of 28 
June that the destroyers were not 
essential to national defense, and Lord 
Lothian.52 Once more the draft was 
approved. 
Lothian transmitted this proposal to 
London. Churchill's 29 August reply 
differed in only a few details from the 
American version, notably in the addi-
tion of Antigua as a base site. The Prime 
Minister stated: 
We are prepared in friendship and 
good will to meet your representa-
tives forthwith, in order to con-
sider the lease for ninety-nine 
years of areas for the establish-











Subject to later settlements on 
points of detail ... 53 
In order to calm U.S. fears about the 
disposition of the British Flee~ in case 
of England's surrender, Churchill de-
vised the following statement for release 
to the American press: 
You ask, Mr. President, whether 
my statement in Parliament on 
June 4, 1940, about Great Britain 
never surrendering or scuttling her 
Fleet "represents the settled policy 
of His Majesty's Government." It 
certainly does. I must, however, 
observe that these hypothetical 
contingencies seem more likely to 
concern the German Fleet or what 
is left of it than our own.5 4 
Consummation. The obstacles to 
consummation of the destroyer deal 
were now largely overcome. A final text 
of the agreement was prepared and 
approved. Admiral Stark gave it his 
certification. At the State Department a 
message for the President to send to 
Congress was drafted. Notes confirming 
the destroyer-bases transaction were ex-
changed on 2 Septcmber betwecn Hull 
and Lothian. On 3 September the Presi-
dent's message together with the de-
stroyer-bases notes and tbe opinion hy 
the Attorney General concerning the 
legality of the transaction were com-
municated to Congress. 
After nearly 4 months of negotia-
tiolls, the trade was completed. 
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